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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
MYERS V. STATE: THE DISCOVERY OF AN OUTSTANDING 
ARREST WARRANT DURING AN ILLEGAL TRAFFIC STOP 
MA Y BE SUFFICIENT TO REMOVE THE TAINT FROM 
EVIDENCE THAT IS SUBSEQUENTLY SEIZED. 
By: Levi Zaslow 
In an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant during an 
illegal traffic stop may be sufficient to remove the taint from the 
evidence subsequently seized. Myers v. State, 395 Md. 261, 291, 909 
A.2d 1048, 1066 (2006). In so holding, the Court established that an 
outstanding arrest warrant is an intervening cause that may be 
sufficient to attenuate an illegal stop and provide independent probable 
cause for an arrest and subsequent searches. [d. at 291, 909 A.2d at 
1066. 
On February 12, 2003, a Pennsylvania police officer initiated a 
traffic stop of Ernest Myers ("Myers") because he noticed that Myers 
was parked illegally, acted in what he felt was a suspicious manner, 
and thereafter drove at a high rate of speed. The officer estimated 
Myers was going 40 mph in a 25 mph zone. Furthermore, the time, 
place, and Myers' similarity to the description of a suspect in a 
number of burglaries in the area, piqued the officer's attention. 
During the stop, the officer noticed a long screwdriver which would be 
capable of making pry marks similar to those found at the crime 
scenes and learned of outstanding arrest warrants for Myers from 
Washington County, Maryland. The officer arrested Myers and 
conducted a search of the car. As a result of the arrest, the 
Washington County Sherriff's department executed search warrants in 
Maryland which led to the discovery of stolen property. 
Myers was first convicted of "theft by receipt of stolen goods" in 
Pennsylvania, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ("Superior 
Court"), Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court, reversed and 
held that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence. The 
Circuit Court for Washington County denied Myers' motion to 
suppress, and a jury convicted him of theft and imposed a sentence of 
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ten years incarceration. Myers appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland which affirmed his conviction. Myers petitioned 
for and received certiorari from the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed whether the 
decision of the Superior Court was binding on Maryland courts. 
Myers, 395 Md. at 274, 909 A.2d at 1056. Myers maintained that the 
circuit court was bound to follow the Superior Court's conclusions that 
there was no probable cause to initiate the traffic stop; there was no 
probable cause to believe Myers was involved in criminal activity; and 
that the exclusionary rule barred the admissibility of the evidence 
obtained by the Pennsylvania police. Id. Finally, the Court addressed 
whether any evidence obtained as a result of his arrest was "derived 
from the fruit of the poisonous tree," and therefore should not have 
been considered in the search warrant application. /d. 
The Court began its analysis by recognizing the general rule that 
the law of the state in which the arrest was made determines the 
legality and reasonableness of a stop absent a controlling federal 
statute. Id. at 275, 909 A.2d at 1056. The Court assumed "arguendo" 
that the initial traffic stop was invalid because, under Pennsylvania 
law, the officer did not have probable cause; although, they did not 
express an opinion as to whether they were bound to follow that 
determination. Id. at 278, 909 A.2d at 1058. Also, the Court 
determined that the federal exclusionary rule was the appropriate 
remedy in this case because the Superior Court did not expressly rely 
on the Pennsylvania Constitution or any other Pennsylvania law in 
suppressing the evidence. Id. 
The Court ruled that the Pennsylvania police officer lacked a 
"reasonable articulable suspicion" to believe that Myers was involved 
in any criminal activity. Id. at 280, 909 A.2d at 1059. In making this 
determination, the Court viewed the totality of the circumstances and 
held that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and no 
probable cause to stop Myers' vehicle. [d. at 281, 909 A.2d at 1060. 
Therefore, the Court was left to determine whether the evidence 
admitted in the circuit court was the "exploitation of that illegality," or 
attenuated from its original taint by the discovery of the arrest warrant. 
Id. 
The general rule is that illegally obtained physical, verbal, or other 
evidence should be suppressed, thereby furthering the purpose of the 
rule "to deter lawless and unwarranted searches by law enforcement 
officers." Id. at 282, 909 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Wong Sun v. United 
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States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1963)). There are, however, three 
judicially recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule which will 
remove the taint of an illegal seizure. Myers, 395 Md. at 284, 909 
A.2d at 1062. The three exceptions are attenuation, the independent 
source doctrine, and inevitable discovery. Id. at 284-85, 909 A.2d at 
1062 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, (1939) 
(establishing attenuation as a sufficiently intervening circumstance to 
remove taint); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984) 
(concluding that if the evidence would have been discovered through 
an independent source, it should not be suppressed); Nix v. Williams, 
467 U.S. 431,443 n.4 (1984) (allowing for the admission of evidence 
that would inevitably have been discovered). The only relevant 
exception in the present case was whether the challenged evidence was 
sufficiently attenuated to remove the taint of the initial stop. Myers, 
395 Md. at 285, 909 A.2d at 1062. 
In determining whether evidence has been sufficiently attenuated 
from its initial taint, the Supreme Court established three factors to aid 
in its determination: "1) the time elapsed between the illegality and the 
acquis~tion of the evidence; 2) the presence of intervening 
circumstances; and 3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct." Myers, 395 Md. at 285-86, 909 A.2d at 1062 (quoting 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)). Simply stated, the 
attenuation doctrine is a way to determine whether there is a strong 
enough connection between the illegally obtained evidence and the 
primary taint to warrant exclusion. Myers, 395 Md. at 286, 909 A.2d 
at 1063. 
In its analysis, the Court concluded that although there were a 
number of seizures over a period of time, including some immediately 
after Myers' arrest, the question of timing is not dispositive, and the 
mere fact that there was little time between the illegal stop and the 
seizure will not independently sustain the primary taint. Id. at 291-92, 
909 A.2d at 1066. The Court also found that the subsequent discovery 
of the outstanding warrants was sufficient to remove the initial taint of 
the illegal seizure and was therefore not considered to be fruit of the 
poisonous tree. Id. at 291, 909 A.2d at 1066. Finally, the Court 
recognized that although the warrants were sufficient to remove the 
taint, it is the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct that is 
central to the analysis. [d. at 292,909 A.2d at 1066. 
Under that analysis, the Court concluded that the Pennsylvania 
officer's conduct was not to effectuate an arrest, but was based on 
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what he believed to be suspicious activity. Id. at 293, 909 A.2d at 
1067. Therefore, although perhaps illegal, the purpose of the officer's 
stop was not egregious and flagrant. Id. The Court maintained, 
however, that if the purpose of the initial stop was blatantly egregious 
and in violation of Myers' Fourth Amendment rights, or if the purpose 
of the stop was to search the vehicle, the search warrants would not be 
sufficient attenuation. Id. at 292, 909 A.2d at 1066. Furthermore, the 
Maryland investigator acted with probable cause, reasonably, and in 
good faith. /d. at 295, 909 A.2d at 1068. 
Myers v. State further blurs the line for police officers who must 
make immediate search and seizure determinations. Maryland 
practitioners and citizens must be aware that illegal police activity will 
often be attenuated or justified based on a standard of "objective" 
reasonableness. In this era of ever-shrinking Fourth Amendment 
rights, Maryland courts are clearly aligning themselves with those 
jurisdictions that consider illegal citizen activity to be a greater danger 
than illegal police activity. 
